34º Encontro Anual da Anpocs

ST04 - Comportamento Político

Do Petismo ao “Lulismo”? Explicando a ausência de coattails nas eleições presidenciais de 2006

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1. Introdução

In 2006, incumbent president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT) easily reelected himself with over 20 million votes over his opponent Geraldo Alckmin (PSDB) in the runoff election. Already in the first round, the PT’s candidate received nearly 49% of the valid votes (46,662,365 votes to be exact). The PT’s success for its second presidential bid, however, did not carry over in the lower federal chamber elections where the party obtained only 82 of the 513 seats at stake (16% of the seats). To be sure, the difference between the PT’s vote for the lower chamber and Lula’s can be attributed to the greater number of parties competing in the lower chamber. But, then again, Zucco (2008) and Hunter and Power (2007) find no statistical association between Lula’s and the PT’s vote for the lower chamber. Their analysis indicates that the PT was not able to follow Lula’s support, especially in the poorest and least developed regions of Brazil. This finding is intriguing and goes against theoretical accounts of presidential coattail effects observed in precedent elections and in other presidential systems. Thus we believe it deserves closer examination.

Past research on US elections have shown that candidates sharing a party affiliation with a popular president candidate seeking reelection generally benefit from the latter’s success. This phenomenon is called a coattail effect. In this paper we wish to understand why the president’s party did not benefit from any coattail in 2006 using electoral aggregated data at the municipal level and individual-level from the 2002 and 2006 Brazilian Electoral Studies (ESEB). In short, the findings indicate that the coattail effect indeed occurred but that it is the government’s coalition partners, especially those closest ideologically, that benefited most from it. Our preliminary results suggest that the PT’s inability to distribute pork, as compared to his coalition partners, explain why the party could not take advantage of the coattail effect for itself.

2. Lula and the PT in 2006: understanding the puzzle

In the 2006 presidential election, president Lula was reelected in the second round, with a margin of 20 million votes over the opposition candidate, Geraldo Alckmin of the PSDB. Lula received 49% of the total valid vote in the first round, and over 60% in the run-off election. The president’s victory was attributed to his ability to mobilize the vote of Brazil’s poorest and least-developed localities, compensating electoral losses in
traditional PT strongholds, the urban and metropolitan core of the South and Southeast regions. Research on Lula’s shifting voting bases has shown that the PT’s success in the presidential race did not bring about electoral gains for the party in the national legislative race (Zucco, 2008; Hunter, 2007; Singer, 2009). As a matter of fact, the PT received 15% of the total vote in 2006, as compared to 18% in 2002.

Zucco (2008) observed that the fact that Lula received far more votes than the PT is not surprising, due to the simple mechanical effect of the far greater number of parties that dispute legislative elections. Further, the president’s voting reflects his own personal appeal, which is not contingent on his party. What is new is the fact that, for the first time, Lula’s vote does not correlate with the PT’s vote for the federal chamber. The table below, extracted from Zucco’s (2008) paper, presents simple correlations for Lula and the PT’s vote at the municipal level since 1994. We see that until 2006, the correlations were very strong and significant, indicating a reasonable degree of coherence between the PT’s territorial bases of support and the president’s. In the last election, however, the correlation is extremely low and does not reach statistical significance.

**Table 1:** Pearson correlation between vote for the PT at the lower federal chamber and vote for Lula at the municipal level, 1994-2006

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson correlation</td>
<td>.56*</td>
<td>.60*</td>
<td>.54*</td>
<td>-.02</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
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*Correlation significant at .05

The divergence between the president’s and his party’s voting bases in 2006 partly reflects the fact that the PT did not succeed in increasing its support in Brazil’s most backward regions as much as Lula did. Hunter and Power (2007) suggest that despite Lula’s impressive inroads into Brazil’s poorest regions, the party’s stronghold remains the more urban and industrialized areas of the country. This hypothesis is confirmed by a comparison of correlation coefficients estimated for Lula and the PT vote, and a series of social, economic and demographic indicators of Brazil’s municipalities. The correlation table below includes five indicators: population, distance
to state capital in kilometers (as a proximate measure of the geographical concentration of the PT’s voting base in metropolitan areas), percentage of the population living in rural areas, industrial GDP as a percentage of municipal GDP, and the share of total households owning a personal vehicle\(^1\). We also included a measure of the share of public administration in the municipal economy (GDPpubshare). Figures are from the 2000 national census, with the exception of industrial GDP and the participation of public administration in the local economy, both calculated for the year 2006\(^2\).

### Table 2: Pearson correlations between selected municipal indicators and vote for Lula and the PT, 2002 and 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2006</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PT</td>
<td>Lula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (logged)</td>
<td>.21*</td>
<td>.07*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance to state capital</td>
<td>-.06*</td>
<td>-.03*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural population (%)</td>
<td>-.24*</td>
<td>-.20*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial GDP</td>
<td>.25*</td>
<td>.21*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of HH owning a vehicle</td>
<td>.45*</td>
<td>.31*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of public spending on local GDP</td>
<td>-.39*</td>
<td>-.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>5504</td>
<td>5506</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Correlation significant at .05

The table above indicates that Lula’s voting base experienced a dramatic shift between 2002 and 2006. It is noticeable the change shown by the coefficient calculated for \% of households owning a vehicle: in 2002, the association between Lula’s vote and the proxy for middle class size was positive and significant; in 2006, the correlation was even stronger, but negative. As expected, the sign and the magnitude of the coefficients estimated for Lula and the PT in 2002 suggest there was a reasonable congruence between the two territorial patterns of voting. In 2006, however, the Lula and his party

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\(^1\) The last variable is used here as a rough measure of the size of the local middle class. In contemporary Brazil, owning or not a personal vehicle is often the dividing line between middle class families with higher incomes, formal jobs and access to credit, and poor families with precarious insertion in the job market.

\(^2\) All the data was obtained from the IPEA database, available at http://www.ipeadata.gov.br.
took different directions: the PT remained stronger in the most industrialized and urbanized municipalities (even though the coefficients estimated for these variables are somewhat weaker in 2006), whereas Lula’s vote was positively associated with the size of the rural population and negatively with industrialization. The same can be said about the coefficients calculated for the percentage of households owning a personal vehicle, as the PT continued to fare better in municipalities with higher percentages. Finally, consistent with Zucco’s (2008) argument on the pro-incumbent vote at the local level, Lula’s vote in 2006 was strongly and positively associated with the local economy’s dependence on government. The correlations estimated for the PT were weaker in 2006 than in 2002, but a negative association remained. Overall, the data suggest that the PT continued to concentrate its support in the most populous, affluent and developed municipalities, notwithstanding Lula’s electoral growth in the most backward localities.

Zucco (2008) has argued that the radical change of Lula’s voting base resulted from the “pro-government” bias of voters living in poor and underdeveloped localities. His statistical analysis of presidential elections since 1989 demonstrated that there is a strong tendency of the poorest regions of the country to vote for the incumbent government, irrespective of the candidate and what he stands for. Even though Zucco does not develop these issues in detail, his argument follows a key insight of clientelism theory, according to which the impact of distributive policies on voters’ welfare is higher in backward as compared to highly developed regions, because in the former private economic activities are underdeveloped or depend on some kind of state support. Hence, citizens should depend more on government action to satisfy their basic needs and earn income (Stokes, 2007; Stokes, 2002; Kitschelt, 2007). Zucco’s (2008) analysis indicates that poor and sparsely populated localities are heavily dependent on government transfers and these are precisely the places where voters exhibit a systematic tendency to support incumbents.

In 2006, the pro-government bias of poor voters living in poor places was maximized by the federal government’s targeted poverty alleviation strategy, of which the *Bolsa Família* program was the centerpiece. The program targets families with an

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3 The positive coefficient for *distance to state capital* indicates, nevertheless, that the party has started moving away from its metropolitan core. Terron e Soares (2010) have shown, in this regard, that the PT increased its support in medium-sized cities in 2006, in both wealthy and poor regions.
income up to R$ 120 a month and conditions transfers on school attendance for kids aged 6 to 15. By 2006, the *Bolsa Família* covered practically all the population below the poverty line: 11 million families or an estimated 40 million people. Several studies have shown a very strong and positive statistical association between Lula’s vote and the municipal coverage of the *Bolsa Família* in 2006 (Hunter, 2007; Nicolau, 2007; Soares, 2008; Zucco, 2008). Although the program cannot be considered an example of clientelism, for the selection of beneficiaries is based on universalistic criteria (mainly income), it is certainly the case that part of its electoral success reflects the targeted and individualistic nature of the benefits.

Most certainly, targeted social spending is not the only factor behind the pro-incumbent vote identified by Zucco (2008). In Brazil, presidents control thousands of nominations in the bureaucracy and they play a preponderant role in the budgetary process. The powers over the budget and the bureaucracy allow president to forge a broad legislative coalition and obtain the support of governors and mayors, which contributed to extend Lula’s appeal beyond his party borders.

But there is more. Lula’s successful economic plan of inflation and deficit control, coupled with a strategy of social redistribution to reduce poverty and boost consumption brought him popular support. Lula’s policies allowed Brazil’s economy to experience “pro-poor growth”. This type of economic growth is defined as a situation in which a reduction in inequality results in higher income increases for the poor relatively to the overall income growth rate (Kawakani, 2005). Not surprisingly, the fast growing regions where poverty decreased the most rewarded the president with landslide victories against the opposition candidate, Geraldo Alckmin, in 2006. On the other hand, in the wealthier and more industrialized Center-South, Lula lost terrain relatively to the 2002 election, which resulted in a tight dispute against his opponent in the 1st round (Soares, 2010).

Interestingly enough, the PT lost votes in the regions where Lula performed worst, but it remained stagnant in the Northeast, where the president obtained smashing victories. It grew only timidly in the North. Table 3 below shows the net gain/loss of votes of the president and his party in 2006 by region.
Table 3: Percentage of vote for Lula and the PT in 2002 and 2006 and the net gain/loss over the period

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>44.41</td>
<td>56.06</td>
<td>11.65</td>
<td>11.80</td>
<td>13.10</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>45.89</td>
<td>66.79</td>
<td>20.91</td>
<td>13.20</td>
<td>13.20</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast</td>
<td>46.50</td>
<td>43.25</td>
<td>-3.25</td>
<td>21.30</td>
<td>16.10</td>
<td>-5.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>49.47</td>
<td>34.89</td>
<td>-14.59</td>
<td>22.00</td>
<td>16.80</td>
<td>-5.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center-West</td>
<td>43.11</td>
<td>38.50</td>
<td>-4.61</td>
<td>16.70</td>
<td>13.60</td>
<td>-3.10</td>
</tr>
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</table>

The regional voting patterns shown in the table are especially puzzling, not only in view of the redistributive impact of the government’s macroeconomic and social policies, but also considering the PT’s historical project of attacking inequality and integrating the rural and urban poor into Brazil’s consumer markets. This lack of association between the incumbent party’s policies and electoral results also contradicts our theoretical expectations regarding presidential coattails in Brazil’s democracy.

National (presidential) and state elections have been held concurrently since 1994, which has increased the interdependence of presidential and legislative elections. Also, with the approval of the reelection law in 1998, presidents and their parties gained an important mechanism to enable the construction and consolidation of electoral coalitions. In view of these changes, one should expect stronger, not weaker, coattails throughout time, notwithstanding the country’s high rates of party fragmentation and the centrifugal effects of federalism.

The institutional features of Brazilian presidentialism grant the president’s party and his coalition allies substantial competitive advantages in the electoral arena, which is yet another reason why one would expect the PT to have grown in size and electoral strength in 2006. The 1988 Constitution increased presidential powers to counterbalance political fragmentation produced by Brazil’s open-list PR electoral system. The policy-making capacity of legislatures at the national level is limited due to institutional rules that provide chief executives with wide powers over budget planning and implementation, as well as the monopoly of legislative initiative in administrative, fiscal and tax matters (Figueiredo, 1999). The legislative process is highly centralized and enables concerted action involving the president and the leaders of coalition parties in
congress. Under these institutional rules, individual members of the government’s coalition have strong incentives to cooperate with the president, in exchange for access to government jobs and budgetary resources (Pereira, 2004; Amorim Neto, 2003).

Given the “Executive-centric” nature of policy-making in Brazilian presidentialism, legislative parties’ power to shape policy and meet voters’ demands depend, to a great extent, on their capacity to control the federal bureaucracy. This implies that the distribution of cabinet positions plays a critical role in the formation of legislative coalitions and in the policy-making process (Amorim Neto, 2007). Meneguello’s (1998) study of cabinet formation in Brazilian presidentialism has demonstrated that the occupation of cabinet positions exerts a positive impact on political parties’ electoral performance. The interaction between the government process and the electoral arena often involves a virtuous circle, as cabinet parties increase their representation in the federal chamber in the following election, and hence become more valuable partners in the president’s coalition.

During his first term, Lula forged a broad and heterogeneous coalition that included the PT’s traditional left-wing allies, the catch-all PMDB (Brazilian Democratic Movement), which controlled the second largest delegation in the lower chamber, and a few small right-wing parties like the PL (Liberal Party) of vice-president José de Alencar. The PT had the largest delegation in the federal chamber at the time and received the greatest number of cabinet positions. We define as members of the government coalition those political parties that occupied ministerial posts for at least 50% of the incumbent president's term and find that eight parties meet this simple criterion: the PT, the centre PMDB, the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), the Democratic Labour Party (PDT), the Green Party (PV), the Brazilian Communist Party (PC do B), and two right-wing organizations: the PTB (Brazilian Labor Party) and the PL. Table 4 below shows the net gain/loss of votes of government coalition parties from 2002 to 2006:

Table 4: Percentage of the vote received by the government coalition parties in 2002 and 2006 and the net gain/loss over the period

4 There was actually a high disproportion of portfolios allocated to the PT, a difference of 30% in relation to its legislative representation (Figueiredo, 2007 #30).
Interestingly enough, the president’s party was the only member of the coalition that did not experience electoral growth from 2002 to 2006. The parties that grew most are the PT’s left-wing allies (PDT, PSB, PV and PC do B): in 2002, these four parties obtained 14% of the national vote, whereas in 2006 their aggregate vote corresponded to 17%. We suspect the good performance of the left parties is related to the lower ideological distance between them and the president, at least as compared to the other coalition members like the PTB, the PL and the PMDB, and to their greater access to cabinet positions.

Table 5 below presents the percentage of the vote received by the PT and its coalition parties for the lower federal chamber in 2002 and 2006, by region. Although the regional variation in the coalition’s aggregate voting does not correspond precisely to the president’s voting patterns, it is noticeable that the coalition performed best in the Northeast region (where Lula made his greatest electoral advances) and worst in the South (where the president suffered the greatest losses). Curiously, the coalition parties grew in the Center-West where Lula actually lost votes in 2006.

**Table 5:** Percentage of the vote received by Lula’s government coalition parties for the lower chamber in 2002 and 2006, by region

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Vote</td>
<td>Vote</td>
<td>Vote</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>-4.4</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>-4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center-West</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>-.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>-.4</td>
</tr>
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</table>

When one analyzes only the performance of the PT and the other left-parties that integrated Lula’s coalition, there is a better matching of presidential and legislative voting patterns: the left bloc grew in the North and, especially, in the Northeast region, but lost votes in the Center-South, which suggests that national incumbency helped left parties improve their electoral performance.

What the analysis of regional voting patterns of the president and the coalition parties suggests is that there was indeed a coattails’ effect in 2006. But, that the parties that benefited most from the presidential coattails are those coalition partners and not the president’s own party. What remains to be explained, however, is why coattails have benefited the coalition partners and not the president’s party.

The empirical evidence presented in this section indicates that the puzzle that emerges from the 2006 elections has two parts. The first has to do with the lack of association between Lula’s vote and the PT’s vote in 2006, and the party’s poor performance in the poorest regions, which benefited the most from social and macroeconomic policies implemented by the federal government. The second element of the puzzle concerns the fact that the PT’s party allies – especially those from the left – have obtained greater benefit from national incumbency than the president’s own party.

3. Understanding why the PT did not benefit from a coattail effect

In this section, we seek to explain the PT’s poor performance in legislative elections in 2006 despite Lula’s electoral success. We rely on two broad accounts of party competition and voting behavior to develop a few hypotheses.
The first possible explanation to this puzzle emphasizes the impact of political institutions on political parties’ strategies to mobilize voters. Traditional models of spatial competition suggest that in a presidential election in which parties must necessarily obtain more than 50% of the national vote, presidential parties have strong incentives to move toward the median voter, moderating ideological appeals. In other words, the separation of powers impacts on party development by forcing parties that compete for the presidency to develop a vote-seeking behavior (Samuels, 2002). In proportional, multiparty elections, according to Downs (1957) classic analysis, the incentives run in the opposite direction, with political parties growing (and surviving) by cultivating specific ideological niches. Applying this rationale to the current scenario, we have that the PT follows distinct strategies to reelect its president (by moving toward the median voter) and maximize its number of seats in the lower chamber (by appealing to left-wing, partisan loyalists). These divergent strategies could explain the growing distance between the president and the party.

The above hypothesis is congruent with Singer’s (2009) analysis of “lulismo” as a personalistic political movement that combines the maintenance of political order and economic stability with social redistribution. The emergence of “lulismo” is understood as a consequence of the Lula government’s strategy of abandoning the PT’s left-wing economic program and adopting instead orthodox economic policies to keep inflation and public deficits under control. According to Singer (2009), the growing divergence between the government and the party’s policy agendas allowed the president to mobilize the support of “lower class conservatives.” The main assumption of the argument put forward by Singer – which lacks empirical support – is that the bulk of the votes obtained by the PT in proportional elections comes from ideological, left-wing voters with high levels of education. For Singer, the party could not gain votes by moderating its ideological appeals because it would imply alienating its core supporters.

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5 Brazil’s electoral system establishes that a run-off election will be disputed every time the best voted for presidential candidate fails to obtain at least 50% of the national vote plus one.
6 It is noteworthy that the greatest change in the PT’s mean ideological position occurred between 2001 and 2005, when the party disputed and won the presidency, and faced the challenges of national government for the first time.
7 It is important to note, however, that the PT legislative representation has experienced growing ideological moderation since the early 2000s. Survey research by Timothy Power (2008) has shown that the PT delegation in the lower chamber moved consistently toward the centre of the ideological spectrum from 1990 to 2005. In that period, the ideological distance between the PT and the catch-all PMDB was cut down by half.
The main implication of the hypothesis on divergent strategies of spatial competition is that, all else being equal, PT voters should be more left-leaning than Lula’s voters. Further, one should expect split ticket voting to be negatively associated with partisanship and left-wing ideology. According to Singer (2009), Lula’s new constituencies in 2006 were more conservative than the PT’s traditional supporters and, for that reason, they should split their vote, supporting an alternative, more moderate party, in national legislative elections. We test these empirical implications by relying on ESEB survey data (yet to be done).

Explanations based on models of spatial competition are limited to some extent, in that they necessarily assume that ideology and party identification play a significant, if not determinant role, in party competition. According to this reasoning, parties will have an incentive to cultivate specific ideological niches in proportional elections if voters are in fact ideologically motivated. This may not be totally true of patronage-centred political systems, in which political parties’ electoral support may reflect politicians’ capacity to deliver pork and patronage to specific localities and voters. If a substantial part of voters are indifferent to party ideology but keen to reward the effective delivery of pork, then parties will have greater incentives to behave as catch-all political machines, rather than develop and maintain a specific and well defined party programme (Kitschelt, 2007).

We believe that ideological mobilization and the reliance on pork are not necessarily mutually excluding strategies, as different types of voters may respond differently to each of these political incentives. For instance, left parties may reinforce lower class voters’ loyalty to the party by rewarding them with public jobs or other individualistic goods but also by defending party platforms that are more reflective of voters’ interests and values.

There are good reasons to believe Brazil’s political system combines both moderate levels of ideological polarization and strong incentives for patronage-centered party competition. The major national parties have distinctive ideological profiles and behave accordingly in congress, which suggests that ideology does play a role in national legislative races (Hagopian, 2009; Figueiredo, 1999; Power, 2008). On the
other hand, Brazil’s PR electoral system and its strong federalism creates incentives for individualistic strategies of legislative campaigning and a localist orientation of parliamentarians. National legislative races are usually tied to subnational party alignments, and may reflect regional and local political struggles. Although voters may choose a presidential candidate with an eye on national issues and national policies, when they choose a candidate to the federal legislative chamber, they are often worried about local issues and the candidates’ ability to bring pork to their electoral bailiwicks (Ames, 2001; Samuels, 2003). Survey research on voters’ behavior in legislative elections in two Brazilian cities has demonstrated, for example, that most citizens prefer candidates preoccupied with local issues, rather than national ones (Ames, 2008). Those more concerned with national issues, however, are more likely to vote on ideological bases.  

Levels of partisanship among voters remain low notwithstanding the gradual institutionalization of the national party system in the recent democratic period. The PT is currently the only Brazilian political organization that achieves significant levels of party identification among voters: a 2007 survey indicated that 20% of Brazilian voters were PT sympathizers (Samuels, 2008). By comparison, the PSDB reached only 6% of party identification in that same year, even though the party governed Brazil during eight years before the PT came to power (1995-2002). Differences in levels of partisanship reflect, to a great extent, the distinctive organizational structure of national parties. The PT and a few other left-wing organizations – most notably, the Brazilian Communist Party (PC do B) –emerged as externally mobilized parties, with a strong national leadership and a coherent party program, but they are an exception to the general rule of weak party organization. Most of Brazil’s national parties may be best described as political machines organized around the control over government posts.

These considerations on Brazil’s political system are necessary to develop an alternative explanation of the divergence between Lula’s and the PT’s electoral coalitions in 2006. In an institutional context in which the major political parties can (and do) win votes by distributing pork and patronage to buy the support of voters and

8 Ames shows that these programmatic voters had a much greater probability to support PT candidates to the federal chamber than candidates from other parties. These results, however, cannot be generalized because the study was conducted in two medium-sized cities, with above average income and social indicators (Juiz de Fora in Minas Gerais, and Caxias do Sul in Rio Grande do Sul) that the rest of Brazil.
attract new members, the electoral returns of strategies based on ideological and programmatic appeals are necessarily limited. This implies that programmatic parties such as the PT face a dilemma once they take over national government. On the one hand, party leaders know that the party can not expect to grow and steal votes from their adversaries in the short run unless they take full advantage of the federal government’s control over jobs and budgetary resources\(^9\). On the other hand, the party leadership also knows that adopting a purely catch-all, clientelistic strategy may cost the loss of votes of core supporters that had been motivated by the party’s programmatic positions and advocacy of universalism and clean government.

For the sake of our argument, it is not essential to determine precisely how the PT has actually dealt with this dilemma. Rather, the main point here is that the PT’s previous organizational structure and electoral base did not allow it to extract full benefit from access to patronage and pork. We rely on a key hypothesis of the clientelism literature according to which having access to divisible goods is not a sufficient condition to gain votes. Political machines must rely on dense and geographically dispersed networks to allocate benefits and monitor voters. Clientelist parties are necessarily decentralized parties, for they require an army of brokers, intermediaries and campaign workers to reach voters (Stokes, 2007).

In Brazilian federalism, state and local executives play a very significant role in the development and management of patronage networks. One must note that several important decisions relative to elections and party organization – such as party primaries to select candidates to all relevant national posts, with the exception of the presidency – are taken at the state level. State governors have the power to implement public policies in areas such as health, education and infra-structure, they exert control over the nomination of thousands of bureaucratic posts and over the allocation of investments within state’s territory. Given governors’ control over patronage and policy, and their influence in party organizations at the subnational level, candidates to the federal chamber have strong incentives to associate their campaigns with the gubernatorial race (Abrucio, 1998; Samuels, 2003).

\(^9\) Of course, incumbent parties may invest resources in the creation of programmatic linkages with voters by implementing universalistic policies. The issue here is that whereas extending levels of partisan support takes time, buying local brokers’ support through patronage is likely to produce immediate electoral gains.
Mayors are also important actors in legislative races, because they play a key role in the intermediation of local citizens’ demands at both the national and state levels. Mayors control formal and informal resources of power that allow them to shape voters’ behavior, especially in the poorest localities. Local chief executive are in charge of implementing several state and federal policies, and, when allied to the state government, they are often responsible for the nomination of local politically appointive posts, such as school principals and police station chiefs. Also, local party machines have a significant influence on local newspapers and radio and TV stations, especially in those places where the local media is directly controlled by the mayor and/or his family and friends. The power and influence of mayors is greatest in small municipalities where the economy depends heavily on government spending. In these settings, mayors’ ability to hire and fire municipal employees and appoint friends and party supporters to state bureaucratic posts at the local level is likely to exert a powerful influence on voters’ choices. With the exception of candidates that concentrate their vote in large and medium-sized urban areas, where local clientelistic networks play a smaller role in voters’ mobilization, aspirants to a national legislative seat have strong incentives to seek the support of local mayors and pay back the local machine by bringing public works to the municipality through amendments to the federal budget. One key implication of these features is that parties’ strength at the subnational level ought to have a critical impact on their capacity to grow in national proportional elections.

We argue that the PT lacked a strong organizational structure at the subnational level in the regions where president Lula experienced the greatest advances in 2006, and for that reason, the party was unable to fully benefit from incumbency. Rather, we believe that other political parties, that were allied with the PT at the national government and had a local structure in place, were better placed to “fill in the gap”, mobilizing the support of the local electorate through the available local networks.

4. Analyzing the role of state and local politics in the 2006 elections

Notwithstanding the party’s victory in presidential elections, the PT elected only three governors in 2002, all in relatively unimportant, small states: Piauí in the Northeast, Acre in the North, and Mato Grosso do Sul in the Center-West. In contrast,
the PT’s major adversary at the national level, the centre PSDB, elected seven governors, including the most populous and economically developed states – São Paulo and Minas Gerais. The PT’s largest ally in congress, the PMDB, elected six governors, in all regions of the country. In the South region, the party took over the government of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil’s fifth largest state in population\textsuperscript{10}. The PT’s major left ally, the PSB, elected four governors, in the states of Rio Grande do Norte, Alagoas, Espírito Santo and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil’s second most populous state. Different from the PT, the PSB had strong roots in sub-national politics in the Northeast region, which happened to be the political home of a prominent party leader\textsuperscript{11}.

In the 2004 municipal elections, the PT elected 408 mayors out of Brazil’s 5563 municipalities. This represented a significant growth in relation to the previous election – in 2000, the PT elected only 187 mayors – but it was not enough to challenge the hegemony of more conservative parties at the local level: the PMDB, the PSDB and the PFL elected, respectively, 1043, 867 and 790 mayors in 2004. It is also noteworthy that the PT obtained its best performance in the largest and more developed cities: the party elected the mayors of 47 of Brazil’s municipalities with 100,000 inhabitants and over, as compared to 39, 28 and 21 mayors elected by the PSDB, the PMDB and the PFL, respectively.

In terms of its regional distribution, the PT’s local representation was heavily concentrated in the South and Southeast regions in 2004. Over 60% of the mayoralties controlled by the party were located in these regions. When one compares these regional patterns with those observed for the PT’s allies at the national level, the party’s relative weakness in the Northeast region becomes evident. Table 6 below shows the regional distribution of the mayors elected by the PT and its coalition partners in 2004 (the table includes only the six largest parties at the local level).

\textbf{Table 6:} Number and percentage of total municipalities won by the PT and the government coalition parties in 2004, by region

\textsuperscript{10} The PMDB provides a useful comparison with the PT because, even though the party has never been able to present a competitive candidate to the presidency, it has maintained impressive strength at the state level, which has allowed it to elect large delegations to the federal chamber. However, the PMDB’s strength in sub-national elections has come at the price of party factionalism, and it would not be an exaggeration to describe it as a federation of regional parties.

\textsuperscript{11} Miguel Arraes, who governed the state of Pernambuco twice, was one of the founders of the national PSB.
In the Northeast region, where president Lula experienced his greatest advances in 2006, the PT elected only 77 mayors, ranking 5th among the members of Lula’s coalition. In contrast, in the PT’s homeland, the Southeast region, the party ranked 2nd, just below the catch all PMDB. It is especially striking the contrast between the regional distribution of local mayoralties observed for the PT and the center-left PSB: even though the latter party was much smaller than the PT nationally, it was able to elect a significantly greater number of mayors in the Northeast region, where it concentrated 63% of its mayoralties. A more detailed analysis reveals that the PSB had greater territorial penetration in the region’s small municipalities, where local party machines are more likely to make a difference in legislative elections. In contrast, the PT performed best in the largest urban areas. The PSB elected 80 mayors in municipalities with up to 20,000 inhabitants (representing 72% of the party’s regional total), whereas the PT elected 42 mayors in these localities (corresponding to 54% of the party’s regional total).

These comparative differences suggest that the PT had a relatively weak local structure to reach poor voters living in small and underdeveloped localities of the Northeast, which represented a substantial share of Lula’s new voters in 2006. It is noteworthy that the PT in 2006 obtained exactly the same share of votes it had obtained in legislative elections in the Northeast in 2002, whereas the PSB, with a greater number of mayors in the least populous localities, increased its share of the regional vote from 6% to 11% between 2002 and 2006.

As seen in Table 3, Brazil’s North was the only region where the PT experienced electoral growth, from 11.8% in 2002 to 13.1% of the vote in 2006. One possible
explanation for the PT’s differential performances in the North and Northeast regions might be precisely in the party’s local strength in each of these regions. In the Northern states the PT counted with a relatively larger local representation, and ranked 2nd among the president’s coalition allies in number of mayoralties. Of the 49 mayoralties controlled by the party, 33 were located in small localities, with up to 20,000 inhabitants. Among the PT’s coalition partners at the national level, only the PMDB elected a greater number of mayors in these localities: 38. If our hypothesis is correct, it was because the PT had a stronger organizational structure to compete for the local vote in the North as compared to the Northeast that it was able to obtain greater benefit from Lula’s electoral growth in the former region.

We tested the effect of party strength at the sub-national level on the percentage difference between Lula’s and the PT’s municipal vote. The dependent variable is intended to capture Lula’s over-performance relatively to his party, which is assumed to be associated with the relative strength/weakness of presidential coattail across Brazil’s territory. In some municipalities and regions, Lula obtained a much larger share of the vote than the PT (and hence, the party benefited less from coattails), whereas in other places, levels of municipal support were just about the same (indicating a coattail effect).

The model we propose includes a set of measures of municipal social, economic and demographic characteristics: percentage of population living in rural areas, the relative share of public sector activities in municipal GDP, and a measure of the municipality’s distance (in kilometers) to the state capital. We also created two dummies to account for municipalities’ relative population size: one for municipalities with up to 10,000 inhabitants, and the other for localities with more than 10,000 but less than 20,000 inhabitants. Municipalities with populations over 20,000 were set as the baseline category. We expected all these variables to be positively correlated with the dependent. That is, the difference between Lula’s and the PT’s vote should be higher in the less

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12 There are some 1800 municipalities in the Northeast and 400 in the North. Hence, the PT controlled roughly 12% of mayoralties in the North and 4% in the Northeast.

13 It is important to note that over 4,000 of Brazil’s 5500 municipalities have less than 20,000 inhabitants. Hence, the baseline category represents only about 1/5 of the total number of municipalities.
urbanized and populous municipalities, farther away from metropolitan areas and more dependent on public administration. The structural characteristics of these localities are likely to favor strategies of party competition that rely heavily on state and local-level patronage networks, which, according to our argument, represented a disadvantage for the PT. Besides, only a minority of voters in the least developed cities should exhibit the kind of national-oriented, partisan behavior typical of the PT’s core constituencies.

An alternative model was estimated by including the proxy of middle class size at the local level employed in the correlation analysis of Lula’s and the PT’s vote (percentage of households owning a personal vehicle). Because both the measures of rural population and contribution of public administration to local GDP presented colinearity problems in this alternative regression, they were dropped off the model. According to our main argument, the proxy measure of middle class size should be negatively associated with the dependent variable. Wealthier constituencies are less likely to depend on local clientelistic networks. Further, the PT has established stronger roots in relatively affluent localities in the South and Southeast regions, which concentrate the bulk of Brazil’s middle class. For both reasons, these localities should exhibit a more partisan behavior and, hence, the difference between Lula’s and the PT’s municipal vote should be lower, all else being equal.

Dummies indicating the partisan orientation of the mayor in each of Brazil’s municipalities were created for the PT and its largest coalition partners at the national level. Two separate variables were defined to indicate mayors affiliated with the PT’s left-wing allies, the PDT and the PSB (coalition mayor - left) and mayors affiliated with right-wing and center allies, the PMDB, the PTB and the PL (coalition mayor – centre/right). The model also included dummies to indicate the presence of incumbent governors affiliated with the PT, and the party’s largest allies at the state level, the PMDB and the PSB14.

We expected the PT incumbent governor and mayor dummies to be negatively associated with the dependent. All else being equal, the PT should benefit more from

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14 The PMDB incumbent dummy includes all governorships conquered by the party in 2002 and the two governors who abandoned their original party to join the PMDB before the end of their terms in 2006: Marcelo Miranda of Tocantins, who was originally elected by the PFL, and Eduardo Braga, of Amazonas, who left the PPS. Both the PFL and the PPS opposed Lula’s coalition at the national level.
presidential coattails in localities where the party was strongest at the state and local levels, and, hence, Lula’s over-performance in relation to the party ought to be smaller. Hypothetically, the coefficients estimated for the incumbent governor and mayor dummies for the PT’s allies should be positive and significant. That is, one should expect Lula to obtain a higher share of the vote in states and municipalities governed by his allies, whereas the PT should perform relatively worst in these places, given the expected association between party’s performance in legislative races and sub-national party strength.

The results of the regressions are presented in Table 7 below. Regional effects were controlled by introducing appropriate dummies (the Northeast was set as the baseline category).

**Table 7: Explaining the Gap between Lula and the PT’s Vote in the 2006 Election**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td><strong>30.834</strong></td>
<td>1,752</td>
<td>0,000</td>
<td>63,517</td>
<td>1,197</td>
<td>0,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>distance to state capital (logged)</td>
<td><strong>0.603</strong></td>
<td>0.228</td>
<td>0,008</td>
<td>-0.062</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td>0.769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rural population (%)</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.295</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDPpubshare (logged)</td>
<td><strong>6.444</strong></td>
<td>0.409</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of households with personal vehicle</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.623</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>population &lt; 10.000</td>
<td><strong>1.652</strong></td>
<td>0.512</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td><strong>1.677</strong></td>
<td>0.438</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>population &gt; 10.000 - 20.000</td>
<td>0.184</td>
<td>0.545</td>
<td>0.736</td>
<td>-0.444</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT incumbent governor</td>
<td><strong>-8.529</strong></td>
<td>0.851</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td><strong>-8.328</strong></td>
<td>0.787</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMDB incumbent governor</td>
<td><strong>11.347</strong></td>
<td>0.852</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td><strong>12.923</strong></td>
<td>0.784</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSB incumbent governor</td>
<td><strong>3.943</strong></td>
<td>0.752</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td><strong>4.336</strong></td>
<td>0.691</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT mayor</td>
<td><strong>-11.631</strong></td>
<td>0.744</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td><strong>-12.103</strong></td>
<td>0.689</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coalition mayor, left</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>0.667</td>
<td>0.869</td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td>0.617</td>
<td>0.885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coalition mayor, centre/right</td>
<td>0.484</td>
<td>0.422</td>
<td>0.252</td>
<td>0.329</td>
<td>0.391</td>
<td>0.400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North region</td>
<td><strong>-16.291</strong></td>
<td>0.824</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td><strong>-18.018</strong></td>
<td>0.761</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast region</td>
<td><strong>-19.787</strong></td>
<td>0.589</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td><strong>-9.176</strong></td>
<td>0.636</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre-West</td>
<td><strong>-22.244</strong></td>
<td>0.827</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td><strong>-16.973</strong></td>
<td>0.759</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td><strong>-39.478</strong></td>
<td>1.018</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td><strong>-26.113</strong></td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As expected, the dummies for party incumbency at the state level have a very strong and significant effect. The model indicates that the gap between Lula’s and the PT’s municipal share of the vote was wider, on average, in states governed by allied parties (the PMDB and the PSB). The effect of the PMDB dummy is especially strong, which may be reflecting differential coalition-making arrangements at the sub-national
level\textsuperscript{15}. The PT incumbent governor and mayor dummies both have a negative effect, as predicted by our hypothesis. Of all sub-national party variables, only the coefficients estimated for the coalition mayor dummies showed no statistical significance.

The effects of the measures of municipalities’ socio-economic and demographic characteristics are congruent with our theoretical expectations. The difference between Lula’s and the PT’s municipal share was higher in the smallest municipalities (with up to 10,000 inhabitants), in both models. The first model shows that the contribution of the public sector to local GDP and distance to the state capital are both positively associated with the dependent variable. In the second model, which included the share of households with personal vehicle, the distance variable is no longer significant. The effect of the proxy for middle class size is very strong and negative, as predicted. Also, the inclusion of the proxy significantly increases the explanatory power of the model.

5. Conclusion

In this paper, we have tried to understand why the PT, in general, did not benefit from the growth in support for Lula in his 2006 reelection bid. Specifically, why did the lower federal chamber PT candidates not benefit from a presidential coattail effect? Our preliminary findings indicate that a coattail effect indeed occurred, but that it is the government’s coalition partners, especially those on the same ideological side as the PT, that benefitted most from it. Our preliminary analysis suggests that the PT’s inability to distribute pork, as compared to his coalition partners, explain in part why the party could not take advantage of the coattail effect for itself.

\textsuperscript{15} Although the PSB and the PT were traditional allies at the subnational level, the PMDB and the PT were often adversaries. For instance, in Santa Catarina and Maranhão the PT and PMDB regional sections were fierce adversaries, even though incumbent PMDB governors supported Lula’s reelection.
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